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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POSSESSION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL
IN THE HOME IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED*
Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969)
Police found three "stag movies" in the defendant's bedroom during a
search for evidence of bookmaking.' The defendant was convicted for know2
ingly possessing obscene matter in violation of Georgia law. The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that an indictment for possession of obscene matter need not allege intent to sell or distribute.3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD,
making the mere private possession of obscene matter a crime is prohibited
Justice Black concurred on the
by the first and fourteenth amendments.
5
theory that all obscenity, public or private, is constitutionally protected.
Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White would have reversed without reaching
the issue decided by the majority because they felt the films were illegally
seized. 6
It had seemed settled law that obscenity was not protected by the first
amendment. 7 In the instant case, the Court through Justice Marshall conceded that past decisions seemed to establish that proposition but distinguished all of them from the instant case because none were decided "in the
context of a statute punishing mere private possession of obscene material.",,
The rationale of the instant case is that, while there is a valid governmental
interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity, it is not so extensive that
it justifies intrusion into the privacy of the home. The first amendment
protects the right to receive information and ideas. 9 When, in addition, the
right to privacy is involved, the normally legitimate interest in regulating
obscenity is invalidated.
The principal concern in past obscenity cases has been with finding a
workable definition for the term "obscene." 10 The standard that emerged
*

EDITOR'S

NOTE: This case comment received the George W. Milam Award as the

most outstanding case comment submitted by a junior candidate in the spring 1969 quarter.
1. 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1244 (1969).
2. GA. CODE ANN. §26-6301 (Supp. 1968): "Any person who shall . . . knowingly have
!possession of . . . any obscene matter . . . shall . . be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one
year nor more than five years ......
3. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 529, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
4.

89 S. Ct. 1234, 1249-50 (1969).

5. Id. at 1250.
6. Id. at 1250-52.
7. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968).
8. 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1245 (1969).
9. Id. at 1247.
10. The basic standard today is: "[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established
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was a variable one,'1 extremely complex and difficult to apply. 12 As a
practical matter, material has not been labeled obscene, absent special circumstances,' 3 unless it was hard-core pornography, 4 and even then perhaps
not unless it was presented in such a way as to offend the public.' 5 Once
material was deemed obscene, however, the government could regulate or
prohibit it as it would any other matter subject to its power. A state did not
have to demonstrate a compelling interest or a "clear and present danger"'16 as
it did to justify regulation of first amendment rights. Only the fifth and fourteenth amendment standards of substantive due process had to be satisfied;
that is, the law had to be rationally adapted to accomplish a reasonable end
within the scope of governmental power.27 The instant case holds that some
obscene material can no longer be dealt with in this way.
The language in the opinion repeatedly indicates that the first amendment is the primary basis for the decision.' s Yet, only private possession of
obscene matter is said to be protected. 9 This presents a logical inconsistency,
in that private possession of obscenity is constitutionally protected but the
principal means of acquiring it (public sale and distribution) are not. Cases
abound in which statutes even indirectly burdening free speech or press have
been declared unconstitutional. 20 Surely, statutes that bar the sale and
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
11. The standard depended upon such factors as the method and extent of distribution, Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (pandering); the purpose for which
the material would be used, Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (prurient interest
test to be applied to group for which distribution was intended); United States v. 31
Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (material being shipped to Institute of Sex
Research not obscene since it did not appeal to prurient interest of recipients); and whether
the material would reach children, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
12. See Comment, The Substantive Law of Obscenity: An Adventure in Legal Quicksand,
13 N.Y.L.F. 81 (1967).
13. Note 11 supra.
14. "[I] have reached the conclusion . . . criminal laws in this area are constitutionally
limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not . . . attempt further to define . . . that
shorthand description .... But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-

curring).
15. Recently, for example, a motion picture that explicitly depicts sexual intercourse
was held not to be obscene under prevailing Supreme Court standards. United States v.
A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious - Yellow," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
17. E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (fourteenth amendment requires
only that states observe "due process" when legislating for the public welfare).
18. E.g., "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films
he may watch." 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1248 (1969).
19. Id. at 1245, 1249, 1250.
20. E.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
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distribution of obscene matter substantially affect its private possession and
use - a constitutional right.

Conceptual problems are presented because the Court uses the first amendment rather than the right to privacy 2' as the primary basis for its decision.
The Court says "this right to receive information and ideas . . . takes on an
added dimension" in the context of a person's own home.2 2 Apparently, the
right to privacy operates to expand the coverage of the first amendment. The
instant case appears to be the first in which this principle was recognized,
but for two reasons this is not especially surprising. First, although it has been
talked about and used in one way or another for many years 2 3 the right to
privacy has only recently been fully recognized as an independent constitutional right. Second, the right to privacy has already affected the application
of the first amendment on several occasions; restrictively, for example, in
cases upholding statutes dealing with libel,2 4 sound amplifying equipment,2 5
and door-to-door selling.26 The instant case demonstrates that the right to
privacy may expand the area of first amendment operation as well as restrict it.
Understanding how the right to privacy expands the guarantees of freedom of speech and press to cover obscenity is difficult. Historically, the first
amendment has been viewed as a protector of ideas and their communication.27 One of the reasons why obscene matter has never been constitutionally
protected is that it has never been regarded as having any ideological content.28 With the holding in the instant case, where the right to privacy is

21. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247 (1969).
23. The first significant commentary was written before the turn of the century, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). An explicit reference
was made to the right to privacy, even before this article, in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Court held in that case that the fourth and fifth amendments
applied "to all invasions on the part of the government and its employe's [sic] of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life .......
The early cases dealt with the
right to privacy as created by the fourth and fifth amendments and limited it to a property
concept. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which Justice Brandeis
wrote his famous dissent in support of "the right to be let alone." The right to privacy
has been extended beyond a material concept involving trespass since then, and Olmstead
was finally overruled as a limitation of the right to privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
24. Curtiss Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). But cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
25. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); cf. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(restrictions can be imposed only if the statute is narrowly drawn).
26. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (commercial solicitation door-todoor not protected by the first amendment). Contra, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943) (distribution of religious handbills door-to-door protected by the first amendment).
27. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing that involved more than the communication
of ideas did not receive full protection as speech).
28. The test for obscenity, which was advanced in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) and
subsequent cases, indicates this. One of the things that is meant by the prurient interest
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involved, the Court has either rejected the traditional meaning of the first
amendment and included within its protection non-ideological material,
or it has decided that obscene matter communicates ideas. This is necessarily
so because the first amendment, although it is expanded by the right to
privacy, is the stated basis for the decision.
Dicta in the case indicate that the Court is adopting the latter alternative
- that obscene material has ideological content. In reply to Georgia's assertion
that a state has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of
obscenity, the Court says that the argument misconceives what the Constitution protects. It protects not merely the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority but "in the realm of ideas it protects expression
which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing." 29 This statement
would be meaningless without the assumption that the films contained ideas.
However, the next paragraph of the opinion meets the issue more directly.
The Court says it is not relevant that obscenity in general, or the particular
films in the instant case, are arguably devoid of any ideological content.
"[T]he line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is
much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn
at all."3 0 Taken literally, these statements would indicate that all obscenity
is constitutionally protected.
The Court next qualifies these dicta by mentioning that the states might
have some power to control the public dissemination of ideas inimical to the
public morality, but the states cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.31 All of this
reemphasizes, rather than resolves the tension created by holding that the
right to receive and use these "ideas" privately is protected while the means
of acquiring them is not.
Georgia also argued that exposure to obscene material may lead to deviant
sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence.3 2 In the context of the instant
case, this amounted to the argument that although private possession of
obscenity might be protected by the first amendment, still a clear and present
danger can be shown that justifies its regulation. The Court did not agree:
"There appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion. . . .Given the
present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession
of obscenity on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it
may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead

test is that the material will affect the individual wholly at an emotional rather than intellectual level. And the "utterly without redeeming social value" test means at least that

obscenity is not the kind of expression of ideas that the first amendment was intended to
protect. See Finnis, The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 222 (1967).
29. 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1248 (1969) (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 1248, 1249 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 1249. It also might be noted here that if government may not concern itself

with men's private thoughts, the prurient interest test for determining obscenity would
seem to be irrelevant.
32. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss1/8

4

Maher: Constitutional Law: Possession of Obscene Material in the Home is
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

to the manufacture of homemade spirits." 33 Presumably, the private possession
of obscene matter does not present a clear and present danger, but the
public sale or distribution of it does. The logic of this conclusion is questionable since in either case the "danger" of obscenity lies in the effect it has on
the individual who receives it, not in its sale or distribution per se. Justice
Douglas has individually expressed the view in a past case 34 that empirical
evidence shows no psychological danger from obscenity under any circumstances. Here for the first time a majority of the Court is adopting that view
but limiting it to private circumstances. In doing so the Court has gone half
way to refuting one of the most basic arguments supporting the regulation
of obscenity. However, this has created yet another logical inconsistency, the
resolution of which would be to hold that the sale and distribution of obscenity also present no danger. Despite its claim to the contrary,3 5 the Court may
be edging toward the position that obscenity in general is constitutionally
protected.
Such a position would resolve the logical inconsistency of the instant case.
It would not mean, however, that the sale and distribution of obscene matter
could not be regulated in any way. Roth v. United States36 rejected the necessity of justifying obscenity regulation by proving that it created a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct. In distinguishing Roth from the instant
case, the Court indicated that the public distribution of obscene material
was subject to different objections than was mere private possession. "The
danger that it might fall into the hands of children . .. or that it might
intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public" 37 were given
as examples of such objections. These would probably be the first areas of
concern if the Court were to overrule Roth and give obscenity general constitutional protection. Exposure to children would be a clear and present
danger in accordance with the normal first amendment standard, and offensive
public distribution would violate the right to privacy of the general public
that, as has been seen, can restrict first amendment provisions.
While perhaps alarming to the lay public, the instant decision is not particularly surprising from a legal standpoint. In 1961, Mapp v. Ohio38 presented the Court with the same issue but the conviction was reversed on other
grounds. Justice Stewart concurred but would have reversed on the basis of
the first amendment. 39 In the same case, four of the seven justices of the Ohio
supreme court felt that a statute that punished mere private possession of

33. Id.
34. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 432 (1966) (concurring opinion).
35. "[T]he States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does
not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home." 89 S. Ct.
1243, 1250 (1969) (emphasis added). One may speculate on the significance, if any, of the
fact that regulate rather than prohibit was used.
36. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
37. 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249 (1969).
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. Id. at 673.
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obscene matter violated the first and fourteenth amendments. 40 Also, the
increasing importance of the right to privacy portended the result in the
principal case.
Moreover, a broad examination of the Court's standards for determining
what is obscene indicates that the Court has been less lenient where broad
distribution or pandering was involved. 4' In some sense the inverse of pandering is private possession. The fact, too, that the Court has generally drawn
the line at offensiveness is more relevant to a concern with public obscenity
than it is to private obscenity. The obscenity standard is not at issue in the
instant case 42 but the social policy considerations that affect the standard
for determining obscenity also affect its constitutional protection. The general
disposition of the Court to protect any legitimate communication of ideas,
coupled with the enormous difficulty of determining what does not convey
an idea for constitutional purposes, resulted in a lenient standard under
which almost nothing was classed as obscene. Similar difficulties will exist
where public concerns clash with the private right to possess obscenity.
The immediate consequence of the instant case is that all statutes that
punish mere private possession of obscene matter are unconstitutional. Thus,
Florida Statutes, section 847.011 (2) 43 which specifically punishes knowing
possession of obscene matter, is unconstitutional on its face. Additionally,
the constitutionality of subsection 847.011 (1) (b),44 providing that knowing
possession of six or more similar or identical items of obscene material is
presumptive evidence of intent to sell or distribute them, will depend upon
its application. While the right of the states to regulate the sale or distribution of obscene matter has as yet been in no way abrogated, it is not likely
that the Court will allow the instant ruling in the instant case to be circumvented by a statutory presumption where other circumstances would indicate
private use. Six stag films, for example, might well be possessed for private
use. The constitutional application of this subsection will necessarily depend
upon the presence in each case of other evidence indicating an intent to sell
or distribute. This effectively renders the provision useless, at least to the
40. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960). This was not determinative
of the case since Ohio law then required that "all but one of the judges" had to agree to
declare a state law unconstitutional, Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1246 n.7 (1969).
41. E.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
42. It was assumed from the outset that the films were obscene. 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1244 n.2
(1969).
43. "A person who knowingly has in his possession, custody, or control any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, sadistic, or masochistic . . .matter . . .or any
article ... of immoral or indecent use, or purporting to be for indecent or immoral use
or purpose, without intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute, transmit, show, transmute, or
advertise the same is guilty of a misdemeanor .. " FLA. STAT. §847.011 (2) (1967). Insofar as
the descriptive words other than "obscene" may mean something more stringent than the
prevailing constitutional law definition of that term, this section of the statute may be
applied unconstitutionally. Subsection 10 adopts the prurient interest test for the word
"obscene" but does not mention the other descriptive words.
44. "The knowing possession by any person of six or more identical or similar materials, matters, articles or. things . . . is presumptive evidence of ... violation .... " Fzk.
STAT. §847.011 (1) (b) (1967).
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extent it deals with similar items, which are relatively few in number. A
stronger case can be made for the statute insofar as it deals with identical
materials, for it is quite unlikely that six or more identical items would be
possessed for private use only.
The other subsections of the statute dealing with seizure 43 and with
transportation of obscene material into the state with intent to sell"6 are

subject to the limitations mentioned above. The prohibition on transmission
of obscene matter to children under the age of eighteen47 should remain
unaffected.4

More generally, Roth remains the law as to nonprivate obscenity, and it
is unlikely, especially in view of probable personnel changes in the Court,
that it will be overruled entirely. Most likely a compromise and a balancing
will occur between the public interest relying on Roth and private right
relying on the instant case. For example, the manufacture of obscene matter
in the home or a "private" sale or transmission of such material in a noncommercial context will probably be protected. On the other hand, it seems
likely that the Court will continue to recognize the right of the general
public not to have obscenity thrust upon it. Also, the Court will probably
remain cognizant of the very real practical difficulty of preventing offenses
to the public's sensibilities and protecting children from obscenity where public sale of such matter is allowed, even without advertising or display. Present
laws restricting the mailing of unsolicited obscenity and those regulating
obscenity in advertising and in the mass media will no doubt survive the
balancing process. Any balancing, however, will necessarily shift the Court
from its former position toward the protection of all obscenity. The shift
will help to resolve the tension created by protecting the private use of
obscenity while leaving the principal means of its acquisition unprotected.
It is also a speculative possibility that the first amendment, fortified by
the right to privacy, may be extended to protect certain types of active conduct
in the privacy of the home. In this regard, the developing concept of "symbolic free speech" in which acts are said to communicate ideas49 might be
coupled with the right to privacy to provide constitutional protection for
certain types of private conduct that the Government may now reach.
The principal case does nothing to relieve the Court of the great difficulty
it has experienced in past dealings with the complex problem of obscenity.
If anything, the problem is now more complex than ever.
W. F.

45.
46.
47.

FLA. STAT.

MAHER

§§847.02-.03 (1967).

FLA. STAT. §847.011 (1) (a) (1967).
FLA. STAT. §847.012 (1) (1967).

48. See 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249 (1969).
49. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 89 S. Ct. 733
(1969) (wearing of armbands at school as social protest protected by the first amendment);
In re Giannini, 72 Cal. 655, 446 P.2d 535 (1968) ("topless" dancing in nightclub protected
by the first amendment as communlication of ideas).
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